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Abstract 
For many years we have been concerned with the role that autopoietic theory can play 
in resolving what is often termed the micro-macro problem in social science.  The 
‗micro-to-macro problem‘ concerns our capacity to explain the relationship between 
the constitutive elements of social systems (people) and emergent phenomena 
resulting from their interaction (i.e. organizations, societies, economies). To this end 
we have argued (Goldspink and Kay 2003, 2004), for a synthesis of autopoietic and 
complexity theory, where autopoietic theory provides a basis for understanding the 
characteristics of the micro-level agents that make up social systems (human 
individuals), whilst complexity theory provides a basis for understanding how these 
characteristics influence the range and type of macro-level behaviours that arise from 
their interaction.  Implicit to this view is the assumption that it is biology which 
specifies the characteristics and qualities of human agents. Therefore it is also biology 
which constrains the range and type of interactions these agents can generate, and 
hence the form of structure which emerges from that interaction.  This approach 
differs considerably from the disembodied sociological path taken in Luhmann‘s 
(1990) application of autopoietic systems. 
The main contribution of Maturana and Varela‘s (1980) autopoietic theory has been to 
provide a concise specification of the defining characteristics of biological agents 
including humans. It serves therefore to advance our understanding of the micro facet 
of the micro-macro problem. Before his death, Varela began to explore further the 
implications of autopoiesis for understanding social macro phenomena drawing 
increasingly on a complex systems view (Thompson and Varela 2001; Rudrauf et al. 
2003). We seek to extend this offshoot of the original contribution.  
In this chapter we attend in particular, to some of the practical implications that result 
from a social extension of autopoiesis.  Principle amongst these is our understanding 
of the basis for and nature of organizational change. We begin by giving a brief 
overview of the micro-macro problem and an outline of our approach to its resolution.  
We then draw on this approach to develop a perspective on stability and change in 
organizations. We illustrate this using two cases and in so doing also provide 
examples of methods which can be used to map the interplay of micro and macro 
behaviour in particular organizational contexts.  
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Introduction 
Many approaches to understanding organization change approach ‗the organization‘ 
as a relatively static entity.  Punctuated equilibrium models have also become popular 
but here too the notion of unfreeze-change-refreeze suggests change as an exception – 
a break with the more normal stability upon which organizational control is predicated 
(Taplikis 2005). By contrast Tsoukas and Chia (2002: 570) have argued that „Change 
must not be thought of as a property of organization. Rather, organization must be 
understood as an emergent property of change. Change is ontologically prior to 
organization- it is the condition of possibility for organization.‟.  Intuitively we agree 
with their position. However it raises some significant questions for practitioners, 
principle among them: if change is constitutive of the organization rather than 
something which managers can control, then how subject to strategic influence can 
change be?  
The problem implied by this question can be resolved to some extent by appreciating 
that it is change at one level which influences stability at another. We typically refer 
to this phenomenon using the concept of ‗emergence‘. The concept has however been 
criticised as a cover all – used to appear to explain what we cannot currently explain 
in scientific terms (Clayton and Davies 2006). It is here then that the micro-macro 
problem takes hold. Emergence remains particularly controversial when applied to 
social science (Sawyer 2001, 2005). The reason is that the mechanisms of emergence 
within social systems can be expected to be different from those present in other 
natural systems, due to the presence of cognitive agents (Castelfranchi 1998; Ellis 
2006; Goldspink and Kay 2007, 2008). How they are distinct is made clear from the 
application of autopoietic theory.  
We use autopoiesis to better understand the reciprocal interplay between the micro 
behaviour of agents on the one hand and the resulting pattern of behaviours at the 
macro level on the other. These emergent macro structures are somewhat robust 
patterns associated with particular groups of agents. They have traditionally been 
referred to using terms like ‗institutions‘, ‗norms‘ and, the focus of our interest here 
‗organizations‘. These patterns do not result from upward causation only, as is the 
case with particle interaction for example, but rather they include a downward causal 
path: constraining the scope of action of the very agents which give rise to them.  In 
other words macro-level patterns have micro-level effects. This has been referred to 
as ‗immergence‘ (Castelfranchi 1998).  
Fuchs et al (2005: 33) takes an emergentist perspective in his classification of 
alternative approaches to the micro-macro relationship within social theory as 
follows.  
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Most social theory falls into one or other of the first two categories. These theories 
work with a dichotomous view of macro and micro: focusing attention on just one 
level or the other and failing to address their relationship. This is consistent with 
Weik‘s (2006) view. She has argued that social theory can be divided into three 
categories, dualist, duality and theories which avoid or deny the separability of micro 
and macro. In social science the micro-macro problem is also referred to as the 
problem of structure and agency. Structure emerges from the agency of social agents 
and at the same time constrains it but neither determines the other. Weik argues that in 
most social theory this micro level capacity for partial independence is commonly 
attributed to intention or purpose – the debate being about how ‗free‘ agents are to 
exercise these with respect to structure. Structure implies a repetitive relation between 
two or more individuals with different theorists positing different dimensions to that 
relation – vis shared knowledge, functions, routines, constraints reciprocal 
expectations, power or force, rational choice, identity need, habit or rule following.  
„Some of these definitions overlap, some have been taken together to form several 
levels of structure embedded in one another…and some are, of course, contradictory.‟ 
(Weik 2006: 3). Another area of confusion relates to where these structures are 
considered to reside –„The most prominent candidate is, of course the individual 
mind‟ however alternatives include: the brain, body, human essence, the act (habitus), 
and language. Finally, the mode of influence between levels is often unspecified: Is it 
causal or something else?  
In short social theory has attempted to resolve the problem using a wide range of 
conflicting theoretical stances none of which have proven satisfactory. Those that 
come closest are in Fuchs dialectical category. These too are diverse, including but 
not restricted to Marxist dialectical materialism, the critical theory of Habermas, the 
critical realism of Bhaskar and the structuration theory of Gidden‘s. A few 
incorporate the theory of autopoiesis with some drawing directly on Maturana and 
Varela‘s original work, whilst others have adopted a more Luhmannian perspective. 
What then does it offer? 
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Autopoiesis 
Before illustrating what an autopoietic view can bring to addressing micro-macro 
interplay to understand real organizational dynamics, it is worth providing a brief 
overview of the key elements of the theory and its implications.  
The theory was developed to provide explanations of the nature and characteristics of 
living systems (biological cells and meta-cellular organisms). The central idea is that 
living systems are characterized by their self-production: the components of the 
system producing the components of the system. A key implication of this is that the 
requirements for the maintenance of self-production constrain the way in which 
individuals can interact with and ‗know‘ their environments. 
Within autopoietic theory, an individual‘s behaviour is determined by particular states 
of nervous system activity (Maturana and Varela 1980), this activity is defined by the 
concept of operational closure, which presupposes that in all cases nervous system 
activity results from and leads to further nervous system activity in a closed cycle 
(Maturana & Varela 1980).  Possible and actual changes in state of the nervous 
system are therefore defined by the nervous system‘s structure and not external 
forces.  External or environmental forces may act as triggers for change but it is the 
nervous system‘s structure that dictates which forces can be a trigger (Mingers 1991).  
Therefore changes to the structure of one person's nervous system, and consequently 
their behaviour, will be unique to that person. The environmental perturbations that 
act as a change trigger in one person will not necessarily trigger a change in another, 
or if they do, the change that is triggered may take a different form and/or have 
different implications for the viability of that person in his/her environment, given 
his/her history. Individuals may contribute to the emergence of a stable pattern, but 
they do so by acting on the basis of their unique history.  
Although the nervous system is operationally closed it is plastic, its structure changes 
over time and it is this quality that allows for changes in behaviour and subsequently 
what we describe as learning (Mingers 1991).  Therefore as the state of the nervous 
system changes, so too will the potential range of behaviours that its structural-
determinacy makes possible. The term used for this history of structural change is 
ontogeny (Maturana and Varela 1992).  
Barandiaran (2005) has argued that the advent of the central nervous system in 
organisms allows the them to exploit the rapid response times of the neural system 
supporting a significantly increased set of responses to environmental perturbation. 
The responsiveness of the central nervous system may be further enhanced to the 
extent that it operates as a far-from-equilibrium system, at the edge of chaos, as has 
been argued within the emerging field of neuro-dynamics (Kelso 1995; Rocha 1996; 
van Gelder 1998; Thompson and Varela 2001; Cosmelli et al. 2007). It is the resulting 
asymmetry between the state space of possible configurations and the range of 
response needed to maintain immediate regulation in a given environment that gives 
rise to the ‗agency‘ that is of concern to social emergentists. According to 
Barandiaran „The higher the agent‟s capacity for adaptively guided self-restructuring 
(plasticity) the higher its behavioural adaptive autonomy and hence its agency‘, 
(2005). Autopoietic theory therefore casts a light on the nature and origins of agency 
fundamental to understanding social emergence, specifying the biological processes 
that support and constrain it.  
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Hejl pre-empted this more recent perspective, (1993) referring to it as ―cerebral 
overcapacity‖. He noted that it conveyed both advantages and disadvantages to the 
agent. The advantage is that a capacity to generate a wide range of responses 
(requisite variety) improves the agents survivability in a wide range of environments. 
The disadvantage is that this plasticity contributes to the contingent nature of agent-
agent and agent-environment interactions. It dramatically increases the non-linearity 
of the system and hence reduces its stability: it is a double edged sword. The resulting 
variability can therefore only be harnessed by the agent to the extent that it can be 
channelled or constrained at least over short time frames. Hejl notes, “The only 
„solution‟ to this problem seems to be society” (1993:229). In other words social 
structures represent dynamic attractors which imply a temporary reduction in 
complexity. This supports agent viability in the short term while at the same time 
giving up none of their intrinsic and open ended flexibility to adjust to changing 
circumstances in the medium term.  
These social attractors which provide a temporary reduction in complexity are a 
product of the recurrent interaction – structural coupling in Maturana and Varela‘s 
terminology – between agents, in the context of a feedback path between structure and 
agent. We have argued (Goldspink & Kay 2003; 2004) that structural coupling is the 
mechanism by which all social structures emerge and are maintained, including those 
we refer to as organizations. Thus structural coupling constitutes the generative 
mechanism which gives rise to social organization. Structural coupling implies the 
coordination of behaviour between agents – the behaviour of one agent triggers a 
reciprocal behaviour in those with which it is coupled as part of a closed network or 
domain of reciprocal interaction. Maturana and Varela refer to a domain of coupling 
as a phenomenal domain.  
In other words, when considering social systems, we are looking at self-organizing 
phenomena. It commonly results in the formation of nested hierarchies and 
heterarchies of phenomenal domains. When organised hierarchically each domain 
constrains the range and scope of behaviour of that above it. Intersecting domains (ie 
domains which include some common agents) within a heterarchy perturb one another 
and may themselves become structurally coupled. In human social systems the 
hierarchy will include behavioural and linguistic domains and the heterarchy will 
comprise the many social domains any individual may participate in simultaneously 
(family, club, work group).  
Bridging the Micro-Macro Divide 
Our approach brings together the autonomous agent ontology of autopoietic systems 
described above with complexity theory. Autopoiesis provides a model of how macro 
(social) phenomena emerge from the complex (and non-linear) interplay between the 
heterogeneous agents (people) which make up a social system. Complexity theory 
allows us to explain the resulting dynamics by describing the generative processes 
that result when these agents enter into recurrent interaction and become structurally 
coupled. From this perspective social systems can be seen as a specific class of 
complex system and it is autopoiesis which clarifies the distinguishing characteristics 
of the constitutive agents and hence the range and class of behaviour which can 
emerge. In particular it provides an account of the cognitive range and resulting 
linguistic/reflexive character of social agents (Goldspink and Kay 2007).  
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This, of course, represents an emergentist view, but one very different from that 
involving physical systems (Davies 2006). In human social systems, including 
organizations, there is an additional feedback loop made possible by the fact that 
human agents can observe at a distance, distinguish pattern at the social level, 
recognise themselves as contributors to that pattern, and change their behaviour 
accordingly (Goldspink and Kay 2008). From this perspective an organization‘s 
apparent coherence is a product of self-referential cycles (1981; Hejl 1984, 1993) 
generated as emergent structure results from agent interaction and then feeds-back to 
constrain agent behaviour.  
In order to understand the change which is producing the patterns which characterize 
an organization at a given time there is a need to pay attention to this dialectic 
between macro and micro behaviours. In human social systems most of the action 
happens in and through the linguistic coordination of the coordination of action 
(Maturana and Varela 1980; Maturana 1988; Maturana 1988). This is to say that 
human social structures arise and are maintained in linguistic phenomenal domains. 
The way in which people place themselves in the context of organizing, as well as the 
way in which they make sense about others, and place themselves in relation to 
physical (e.g. building layout, geography) and social artefacts (such as norms, rules 
and structures and information technology) will largely be revealed in the way they 
use language. Language use will therefore reveal a great deal about the constitutive 
mechanism of the organization as a distinct social phenomena. The emerging 
linguistic nexus will contain nested patterns of stability and points of potential 
instability which provide targets for study and intervention.  
It is our proposition that for an organizational change intervention to be effective it 
needs to be designed with an appreciation of the patterns and drivers that, in the words 
of Tsoukas and Chia, describe the change dynamics from which the organization 
emerges. These will be specific to an organization at a given point of time. In 
complex systems terms, the patterns are attractors of the system and the drivers are 
the states of variables that maintain the operation of the system on any particular 
attractor. But what are the variables? The state space of a social system comprises a 
dimension (degree of freedom) for all of the behaviours which can be generated by 
the agents which constitute it. In human systems such as organizations, this includes 
linguistic behaviour. Language is highly flexible and recursive (distinctions on 
distinctions) and as a result the state space it supports effectively has infinite 
dimensionality.  It is this vast space of possibility which, as we have already 
discussed, is the basis for agency and which explains the inherent flexibility of social 
systems. However, as with many complex systems, at any particular time a much 
more limited set of behaviours may explain the dynamics at the level of interest. It is 
this limited subset of behaviours which we refer to as the drivers of the change 
dynamics of the organization. These are the relatively small number of behaviours 
(including linguistic utterances) which generate and maintain a particular attractor. 
These attractors are of course the cultural norms and institutions which combine to 
support the higher order attractor which we refer to as ‗the organization‘.  
For many managers detecting these drivers is an intuitive process or one based on 
experience, however, more systematic research methods may also be used to surface 
them. Once the key drivers influencing such patterns have been identified the 
manager can take action to disrupt those that appear to support undesired stability 
and/or stimulate those that might support desired change. 
 7 
While developments in complex systems and social simulation have advanced our 
ability to map complex dynamics, this has generally been in systems where agents 
have limited cognitive capacity (Sawyer 2003, 2005).  While developments in these 
techniques hold promise for the future, at the current time there are few techniques 
that support our understanding of dynamics that result from the reflexive emergence 
associated with human agents (Goldspink and Kay 2007; 2008; 2008). It is therefore 
necessary to use more conventional research methods to gain insights into the 
operations of organizations. A range of methods have been developed for the study of 
linguistic interaction. Some focus on mapping the denotative content of utterances 
while others are concerned with the illocutionary or pragmatic force of language as a 
basis for direct influence (Searle 1969; Habermas 1976)
1
. In the following two cases 
we illustrate techniques which can be employed to surface the change dynamics from 
which the organization emerges, focusing primarily on alternative methods for 
linguistic analysis. 
The Case studies  
Normal qualitative or quantitative techniques will often provide a static snapshot of 
pattern at one or more levels but leave much of the generative process unclear.  In 
particular, many conventional methods, founded as they are on functionalist 
reductionism, fail to support any analysis of the interplay between micro and macro 
levels.  However creative recombination of existing techniques sometimes makes 
them more useful. In the first case study we combine two well established methods; 
narrative analysis (Bruner 1991, 1991; Snowden 2001; Browning and Boudes 2005) 
and repertory grid technique (Fransella et al. 2004; Jankowics 2004) and illustrate 
how these can be used in combination to generate deep insights into factors which 
influence the dynamics of an organization. In the second case we use analysis of the 
illocutionary force of language to identify influence patterns associated with 
governance of an institution. 
Case Study One: Financial Services trust and innovation potential 
The research context was a small business unit within a large financial services 
institution.  The business unit in which the case study was conducted was lead by a 
General Manager and a six Heads of Department each with multiple direct reports in a 
strongly hierarchical structure.  Each department in the business unit was responsible 
for the management of different outsourcing arrangements and contracts with 
suppliers. The leadership team were concerned at the low level of collaboration 
between the different Departments and the effect this had on innovation and the 
quality of decisions making.  In response they designed a small intervention to 
facilitate collaboration across the Business Unit.  The task involved bringing together 
Senior Managers from the different Departments to solve a set problem.   
The managers were asked to establish a taxonomy against which the top 100 suppliers 
could be categorized, according to whether they were strategic (bringing new 
capability), aligned (providing improved capability to an existing strategy) or standard 
(providing supply to a non-strategic function). It was intended that the taxonomy 
would form the basis for new relationship management models. Participation in the 
project was voluntary and undirected: those who volunteered to participate were 
                                                 
1
 We are examining this in another case study on  normative self-organization in the Wikipedia  - see 
Goldspink, C. (2007). Normative self-regulation in the emergence of global network institutions: The 
Case of Wikipedia.  . ANZSYS07. Auckland, New Zealand. 
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expected to self-organize in order to clarify and generate strategies to address the 
problem.  The voluntary nature of participation resulted in only about half of the 
potential participants taking part. 
The outcome of the project was seen by most people associated with it, including the 
General Manager, to be unsatisfactory, both in terms of the proposed solution and the 
collaboration achieved. The group, working on the project fragmented into two sub-
groups with each advocating incompatible solutions. The fact that such a relatively 
simple task could not be completed came as a shock to the GM, who suspected there 
were deeper issues at play.  We were asked, as people independent of the institution, 
to explore the reasons why the exercise failed.  Our brief was to understand the factors 
affecting the group‘s ability to collaborate: why couldn‘t a group of intelligent, 
experienced managers, organize themselves to complete a relatively simply problem 
solving activity?   
Methodology 
Eleven Senior Managers took part in our study drawn from a group of eighteen 
possible participants.  Participants were selected at random from a list of all the senior 
managers.  Six out of the eleven interviewees had taken part in the exercise, whilst the 
others, although aware of it, had either specifically chosen not to be involved, or had 
sent a representative from their team.   
We sought to gain an understanding of the recent history of interactions, the 
environment and how both individual (micro) sense-making and (macro) institutional 
structures combined to limit collaboration. To achieve this, a methodology which 
combined narrative and Repertory Grid methods was employed. Both narratives and 
the repertory grids were collected in a single interview which lasted on average about 
one and half hours.  
Narrative 
Narrative is seen from a number of perspectives within the social and organizational 
sciences. Most commonly it is encountered as a method – one particularly appropriate 
to: 
…examine the interconnectedness of human agency and social structure and the 
temporality of historical events in processual ways. (Gotham and Staples 1996: 481).  
It has, however, been argued to be at the core of the functioning of human meaning 
making – the narrative mode of thought (Bruner 1991; Dautenhahn 2002). Bruner 
observes that there is a sense in which: 
…narrative, rather than referring to „reality‟ may in fact create or constitute it…‟ 
(1991: 13).  
From this perspective, narrative data provides an account both of how people interpret 
past events and how those interpretations play a role in embedding particular ways of 
thinking and knowing in the culture of the organization – how they come to be 
constitutive of the organizational reality. When we construct narratives we place 
ourselves as a character, even if it is one of innocent bystander. Narrative can reveal a 
lot about the part and future role an actor may play. We can and do of course revise 
our narratives. We will, however, be very reluctant to change the central character – 
ourselves: the grand narrative that is our sense of identity. Narrative data then 
provides insight into the relationship between events – i.e. how the 
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observer/participant sees how events are linked in time.  More than this, and 
significantly for this study, it captures individual and collective accounts of the 
interplay between individual behavior and collective consequences. These accounts 
play a part in the maintenance of existing order and/or to reflect the basis for change 
in established routines by revealing compartmentalisation in the linguistic domains.   
In this case study a very simple narrative collection was undertaken.  This involved 
asking participants to recall two recent collaboration experiences with which they had 
been involved within the institution: one a positive experience and the other a 
negative experience.  Not all participants were able to think of two stories that they 
felt were worth telling and as a result 14 stories were collected out of a possible 22. 
The stories were analyzed with the participant at the time of the interview. Six key 
events were selected that ‗stuck in their mind‘.  These events were equivalent to what 
David Snowden (2000) would describe as an anecdote.  Breaking the stories down 
into anecdotes supported analysis of the stories as a whole but also identified discrete 
events for subsequent thematic analysis across narratives. Eighty four separate 
anecdotes were collected and clustered according to commonalities in their content, 
i.e. common words, depiction of similar events etc 
Grid Interviews 
Personal Construct Theory was developed by George Kelly (1963) in the 1950s. 
Central to the theory is the idea of constructive alternativism (Bannister and Fransella 
1989). This simply states that any event or situation is subject to alternative construal 
by different individuals. An event can carry many different meanings and the meaning 
it carries for any individual will depend on how he/she construes it at that time and 
how it fits (its implication) within his/her existing construct system. His/her existing 
construct system is a product of prior acts of construal and forms a hierarchical 
system of more or less tightly held conceptual distinctions which orientate behaviour. 
Kelly saw this construct system as dynamic – being constantly modified as the agent 
acts in the world and attempts to be effective within it.  
While a construct system is specific to the individual and forms the basis of that 
individual‘s agency, it is a product of his/her history of interaction in the current and 
other social domains. Constructs low in the hierarchy have fewer dependent 
connections with other constructs and can be surrendered or modified more readily 
than those at the top of the hierarchy. Super-ordinate constructs form primary 
orientating distinctions: they are associated with world-views and individuals will 
generally be reluctant to change them as they have profound implications for the way 
he/she sees and orientates him/herself in the world.  Kelly (1963) argues that all social 
processes necessarily involve the mutual construal of others construction and that this 
gives rise to some commonality of construction (consensuality) in that domain of 
interaction.   
Repertory grid (Fransella et al. 2004; Jankowics 2004) is one of a family of related 
methods developed by Kelly and others to make Personal Construct Theory 
operational. In the context of this case study Repertory Grid offered a means for 
mapping both individual (micro) and collective (macro) patterns of construal within a 
particular social domain. Furthermore, Grid analysis supports the development of 
metrics which allow some prediction of how willing or likely individuals would be to 
change their construal and thus how responsive they may be to alternative change 
interventions.  
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Repertory grids collect fine grained data about individuals sense-making about some 
target. While the data is fine grained it is also sharply focused so the challenge in 
using grid as a means for data collection is to ensure that the data converges well onto 
the topic of inquiry. Critical here are the choice of items of experience (‗elements‘) 
that will be used to ‗elicit‘ ‗constructs‘ and the focus question used during elicitation 
(Jankowics 2004). Elements need to be tangible items of experience (i.e. time bound 
events, things or people).  For this exercise we chose to use relational descriptors as 
prompts and to have the respondents supply specific people who matched the 
descriptor
2. These people then became the elements in that respondent‘s grid. Each 
respondent would have different individuals, but individuals which were selected 
against criteria common to all respondents. Respondents were asked to identify eight 
colleagues from within the senior manager team who matched the following 
descriptions:  
 A colleague with whom I share information. 
 A colleague with whom I don‘t or seldom share information. 
 A person who is senior to me whom I learnt a lot 
 A person who senior to me from whom I learnt a little 
 A direct report with whom I share info 
 A direct report with whom I don‘t share 
 A colleague who I trust implicitly 
 A colleague that I don‘t trust. 
 A colleague I feel comfortable asking for advice 
 A colleague I don‘t feel comfortable asking for advice 
These descriptions were considered to capture qualities of relationships associated 
with collaboration and also to assemble into an approximate continuum of relational 
strength.  The minimum quality of relationship upon which any level of collaboration 
could be built was taken as a ‗willingness to share information‘.  Above that would be 
a relationship in which the respondent would be ‗comfortable asking advice‘; ‗learn 
from‘; and ‗trust implicitly‘.  
Constructs were then elicited using the triadic method (Fransella 1977) using the 
comparison question ‗Which two of these people is similar to one another and 
different from the third in terms of how they helped or hindered collaboration‘?. The 
answers were captured directly on a grid and scored by the respondent in the normal 
way. 
Analysis 
All the people involved selected and described the same negative experience – the 
exercise in generating collaboration discussed earlier. As might be expected the 
narratives captured quite distinct and different accounts and interpretations of events: 
unique personal histories of the shared experience. These narratives provided 
anchoring events against which the individual sense-making of the participants (as 
revealed by the repertory grids) could be interpreted.  They also revealed the wider 
environmental factors and historical sequence, as well as the individuals reading of 
                                                 
2 In a more recent related study which focused on innovation rather than collaboration and trust as with the case 
study reported here, in this latter case  ‗innovation events‘ were taken from the narratives and used as elements.  
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cultural rules, norms and institutional practices, which they believed influenced the 
outcome. 
Grids were analyzed using the software package Idiogrid (Grice 2002). Patterns in the 
relationship between elements and constructs were examined using Principal 
Component Analysis. This enabled us to identify, for each respondent, the type of 
person he she was likely to share information with compared to those with whom 
he/she would be unlikely to share; what type of person he/she would trust compared 
to not trust etc.  It also revealed the degree of association between the element classes; 
if likelihood to ‗share information‘ was closely associated with ‗trust‘ or based on 
different factors in a relationship for example.  
According to Kelly, a person‘s construct system provides them with a basis for 
hypothesizing about consequences of their and others actions.  Tight construal (as 
indicated by a high mean correlation between constructs in the grid), would suggest 
that a respondent would have relatively unvarying predictions based on his/her 
construal of a situation. In other words, the characteristics the respondent attributes to 
individuals would, from his/her perspective, be expected to provide good prediction 
of the collaborative behaviour of others.  Loose construal, by contrast, would suggest 
a person with more flexible views, someone open to surprise.  Inferences can 
therefore be drawn about a respondent‘s openness to change. In addition an ordination 
score can be used to reveal the location of a construct within the respondents construct 
hierarchy, with higher scores suggesting higher ordination or more meaningful (and 
abstract) constructs (Landfield and Cannell 1988). Individuals are less likely to be 
willing to change higher order constructs as they have significant implications for 
how he/she makes sense of the world (Kelly 1963; Bannister and Fransella 1989).  
Combining the results 
A comparative analysis of the results of the two data sets was undertaken on two 
levels.  Firstly, individual stories were mapped to individual repertory grids. These 
two data sets revealed insight into which constructs in each individuals meaning 
system primarily orientate their construal of events and guide their action. Secondly, 
the narrative clusters emerging from the thematic analysis of the stories were mapped 
to the output from the group grid analysis. 
Usually repertory grid analysis is undertaken at the individual level, however, in this 
instance we conducted a thematic analysis across the constructs of the entire group 
(see Jankowics 2004 for a systematic process for doing this).  This analysis provided 
insight into how each agent made sense of their situation and the degree to which 
there were commonalities to this sense-making.  Mapping these two together revealed 
the areas of common construal around a distinct series of events.  It also means we 
could see the depth with which that construal is held and therefore also which 
dimensions of the social system‘s patterns can easily change, and those that will not. 
From the combined analysis it was possible to discern three primary distinctions that 
orientated respondents toward one another and influenced their willingness to 
collaborate.  
Observations 
Approximately two thirds of the respondents had one or more of these as key 
characteristics in the way they distinguished collaboration between members of the 
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group.  These three distinctions appeared to form the basis for the creation of sub-
groups within the broader team, where people of like characteristics have a much 
higher propensity to trust and collaborate with each other rather than those they 
perceived as being different.  The combination of depth with which these constructs 
were held and the degree to which they were shared across the group strongly drove 
the eventual outcome of the particular activity we studied, i.e. the group that was 
supposed to be collaborating split to create sub-groups closely aligned to the 
constructs described above. 
What is interesting here, is that overtly all the participants, wanted to collaborate, and 
indeed initially did collaborate around the problem they had been set, thus creating a 
new pattern of interaction that had not existed before.  However, over a relatively 
short period, this new pattern broke down with a slightly modified version of the pre-
existing pattern of interaction re-emerging.  In the evidence collected there is a clear 
explanation for this. Individuals were construed through established constructs and 
these influenced subsequent behaviour. As there was nothing in the design of the 
intervention which was directed at challenging or disrupting the existing ways of 
making sense of the situation, and in particular, nothing powerful enough to compel 
the need to reconsider deeply held constructs, no change was achieved. On the 
contrary, the existing patterns reappeared in a slightly modified form.   
Conclusion on case study one 
This case selected for this research centered on an intervention designed to address a 
limited capacity for innovation in a senior management team – i.e. a perceived 
inability for managers to bring new ideas, understandings and capabilities to 
challenging situations. We have examined the reasons for the failure of this 
intervention by seeking better to understand the way in which individuals contribute 
to maintaining current patterns in the organization and how the intervention failed to 
address these. This represented a move away from approaches which treat 
‗organizations‘ in a reified way to a complex systems view focusing in particular on 
understanding the interplay between macro and micro levels.  
The intervention initially used to try to build collaboration in this work unit, assumed 
that collaboration was not occurring due to formal structural inhibitors (institutional 
silos and or physical distance) and/or lack of opportunity. It was anticipated that 
providing different people from different backgrounds with the opportunity to work 
on a common project would be all that was required to overcome the problem of lack 
of collaboration. This proved too simplistic as it failed to identify the way in which 
individual and collective sense-making around who and when to share information or 
trust had developed within the organization and had come to constrain the range and 
type of  relationships members were prepared to participate in.   
The data gathered using both narrative and repertory grid methods revealed a more 
complex picture. The senior management group was shown to have formed a set of 
ways of interpreting their environment which limited their willingness to engage on 
the basis of three dimensions of relationship. These were not related to the formal 
structure or to physical proximity directly (although these would have influenced the 
formation and maintenance of the dimensions found) but were culturally stable 
dimensions which had become self-maintaining attractors. This combined with a 
pattern of tight construal contributed to a very stable system whereby individuals 
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sense-making reinforced cultural patterns which shaped interaction so as to reinforce 
individuals sense-making in a manner which restricted the possibility of change.  
This analysis supported the argument that organizational behaviour is a complex 
product of the interplay between individual agency and institutional structure and that 
these come together to form phenomenal domains. We have argued that unless 
insights can be gained into the drivers which support attractors in these domains 
intervention is likely to be ineffective. We have shown how conventional methods, in 
this case narrative and repertory grid technique may be combined to help locate these 
drivers in the linguistic domain pertaining to the particular context.  
Case Two – Wikipedia 
This case concerns a less conventional form of institution – an online ‗community‘ 
albeit one which has self-organized to produce a product more commonly produced 
by a command organization. The interest here was to understand how widely 
dispersed and heterogeneous (in terms of having different skills, knowledge, goals 
and resources) agents can come together to produce a credible encyclopaedia.   
This case is being undertaken as a part of the EU funded research project titled 
Emergence in the Loop (EMIL). EMIL is explicitly concerned with the micro-macro 
problem and is using both empirical and computer simulation methods to advance our 
understanding of it. The insight behind the EMIL project is that this two-way 
interpenetration of micro and macro levels is fundamental to ‗normative action‘ in 
social systems. Agents perceive higher order social structures (norms) and (perhaps) 
change their (micro) behaviour in response, thus at the same time acting on the norm 
(perhaps reinforcing it or diminishing it). The case studies chosen therefore involve 
the study of the emergence of social norms. First among these is that of Wikipedia.  
Wikipedia is of interest as the individuals that that have participated in creating it 
appear, through their collective action, to have emerged a set of permissions, 
obligations, rules and norms which bring it into being and maintain it as a social 
system: it has bootstrapped itself into being. Significantly, this was not intended or 
foreseen by those who initiated it (Sanger 2005). From a governance perspective there 
are very few means within Wikipedia by which formal control can be exercised and it 
therefore relies on emergent self-regulation to function despite significant 
perturbation from ‗vandals‘ (task saboteurs), ‗trolls‘ (social saboteurs), and turnover 
of contributors in the context of a task which may require the resolution of 
emotionally and value based conflict. 
That said the theoretical lens of norms adopted by the EMIL project is problematic. 
Normative theory has functionalist origins and reflects the confusion surrounding the 
macro-micro problem. There remains considerable confusion, for example, as to 
whether ‗norms‘ are best ascribed as ‗in‘ the environment or ‗in‘ the agent. There is 
debate also as to whether normative order is the result of agents applying rules or 
reflects pattern which appears ‗as though‘ it is rule based. We approach it here 
through our own theoretical lens as outlined earlier in the paper.  
Wikipedia can help us to understand: 
 How people influence one another and converge on common expected patterns 
of behaviour; 
 The emergence and role of social constructs which have become somewhat 
‗reified‘ within a particular consensual domain (rules and explicit norms) in an 
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open volunteer community where there is little to no hierarchy and limited 
capacity for formal sanction and which must continue to attract and retain 
agents if it is to survive (is in a sense self-maintaining and producing); 
 How these norms and rules are generated and maintained within behavioural 
and linguistic domains; 
 The relationship between goal, technical artefacts and social structures and the 
exercise of individual agency within the resulting domains.  
Methodology 
In Wikipedia there are two classes of activity: 
 editing activity; and  
 conversation about editing activity. 
As this study was not concerned with the editing activity but with the self-organizing 
and self-regulating phenomena which make it possible, the Discussion pages of a 
sample of Controversial and Featured articles were analysed.  Controversial articles 
were chosen as they were more likely to involve the need to resolve conflict and 
hence place greater demand on effective normative regulation; Featured articles by 
contrast may be so rated due to the attainment of a higher level of consensus among 
participants.  
The activity on the Discussion pages comprises a series of ‗utterances‘ or speech acts 
between contributors about editing activity and the quality of product. The only 
means for editors to influence one another‘s behaviour (to structurally couple) is 
through these utterances. On the face of it then, these pages should provide a fertile 
source to support analysis of how self-organization was occurring and to identify the 
agent characteristics and mechanisms involved. 
It was anticipated that the process may involve quite subtle use of linguistic cues. 
Accordingly sampled pages were coded to a high level of resolution using the Verbal 
Response Mode (VRM) taxonomy (Stiles 1992). VRM is very attractive where there 
is a need (as in this case) to capture many of the subtleties of natural language use that 
derive from and rely on the intrinsic flexibility and ambiguity of natural language yet 
map them to a more formal or axiomatic system needed for computer simulation. A 
range of additional codes were applied, including; whether a listener accepted or 
‗validated‘ an utterance; the explicit invocation of norms or rules; the associated 
deontic command; and the style and focus (subject) of the utterance.  
For the study we randomly selected a sample of Discussion pages associated with 
both Controversial and Featured articles. At the time of the study (May/June 2007) 
there were 583 articles identified by the Wikipedia community as controversial and 
approximately 1900 as featured. The analysis reported here is based on a sample of 
nineteen Controversial and eleven Featured articles. The most recent three pages of 
discussion were selected for analysis from each Discussion page associated with the 
article included in the sample.  
These were subjected to detailed coding using the Open Source qualitative analysis 
software WeftQDA. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis was performed. The 
latter was undertaken by re-processing the coded utterances such that each utterance 
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constituted a case and each applied code a variable associated with that case. This 
data set was then analysed using SPSS and MLWin.  
Analysis  
How might we usefully think about the Wikipedia as an organization? The volunteers 
who participate in Wikipedia simultaneously participate in a number of other social 
domains. For the sake of simplicity we depict just one. Figure two shows the situation 
diagrammatically. Each domain (A-C) is comprised of a number of autopoietic agents 
in structural coupling. The Wikipedia domain represents a fourth domain. The agents 
which comprise it represent nodes of intersection between the other domains. To 
remain viable in all domains, agents at these nodes will need to satisfice the 
requirements for ongoing viability in the other domain to which they belong. In the 
case of Wikipedia, the fourth domain is happening virtually – agents interact by 
observing each others editing behaviour and by interacting linguistically 
(asynchronously and by written exchange). Our analysis was designed to identify 
pattern within this domain.   
Domain A
Domain B
Domain C
Wikipedia Domain
 
We found a distinctive emergent pattern in the utterances. They typically involved an 
exchange of assertions delivered with a neutral – i.e. non-emotive style. There are 
very few explicit praises, or put downs, and few niceties like explicit 
acknowledgements of one another. Seldom do contributors refer to one another by 
nick name – the exchanges are rather impersonal. This does not tally with what one 
would expect if the Wikipedia etiquette 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Etiquette) had been institutionalised. The 
Featured articles conform a little more closely but if we assume that the etiquette 
captures the community‘s explicit ideal and the form of conduct which it collectively 
endorses and strives to achieve (the collective goal), then the actual behaviour is 
significantly different from the intended.  
What kind of phenomenal domain emerges within Wikipedia?  
To think about what is happening in the domain of Wikipedia we can usefully draw 
on Habermas theory of Pragmatics. For Habermas, a successful speech act would be 
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one in which the listener both comprehends and accepts the validity claims made by 
the sender and thus enters into the intended relationship. The tests of validity include 
comprehensibility, truth, sincerity and rightness. Thus for Habermas, a speech act 
only serves to support the maintenance of effective communicative exchange to the 
extent that it is held as valid by listeners.  At the level of the individual agent what is 
held to be valid will largely be a product of their past participation in one or more 
phenomenal domains with the norms or rules typical of that domain. Habermas 
distinguishes between communicative acts and strategic action. The former is action 
based on consensus while the latter implies action resulting from the exercise of 
power or compulsion. The latter is not possible in Wikipedia as there are very few 
means for compulsion or exercise of formal or authoritative power. The intrinsic 
openness of Wikipedia means that the majority of exchanges can be expected to 
conform to the qualities of communicative acts – i.e. bounded and influenced by 
normative behaviour rather than through the exercise of formal authority, power or 
coercion. The existence of community is central to establishing such an environment 
as the heterogeneity of social backgrounds and experiences of participants coming 
together incidentally around the task would likely fail to have sufficient power to 
provide coherence to the relationships unless it had the opportunity to converge 
locally around an accepted set of behavioural regulators. Do we see any evidence of 
this type of regulator?  
The absence of any expression of acknowledgement of emotions and/or similarity of 
attitude (homophilly) among many contributors suggests that Wikipedia lacks many 
of the qualities of verbal exchange that would identify it as strong community. 
Possibly it therefore fails to constitute a distinct consensual domain. It is more 
consistent with being a place to share coordination of a task. This could suggest that 
the goal is the primary orientating point. However, the lack of quality of discourse 
needed to achieve consensus is more indicative of a brief encounter between different 
and established milieux which struggle to find common understanding rather than of a 
community committed to a common goal (Becker and Mark 1997). This might 
suggest that the primary influence of the utterance strategies employed by agents is 
the consensual domain/s to which they belong in their wider life – not the immediate 
environment of the Wikipedia. If this were the case then we would expect to see 
speech acts which are a minimal accommodation: are minimally concerned with 
establishing understanding and aimed at a pragmatic accommodation or satisficing of 
presenting demands from different editors. Certainly this is one way of interpreting 
the patterns observed in the data.  Similarly we would expect to find that local norms 
and rules had little effect and that social behaviour was primarily influenced by the 
socialised ‗norms‘ consistent with the editors primary domains – that is to say – 
brought in from outside the Wikipedia.  
Conclusions on case two 
In this case we are particularly confronted with the epistemic implications of the 
theory base we are following. Where do consensual domains begin and end?  Does 
the communicative activity in Wikipedia give rise to a distinct phenomenal domain or 
can it only be understood by appreciating the domains with which its participants are 
involved outside of the Wikipedia? As Hejl long ago noted, the attributions of closure 
to social domains (as compared to physical ones at the level of biological entities) is 
an epistemic act not an ontological one and it reinforces the view that social systems 
are not autopoietic in and of themselves.  
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Hejl (1984) distinguished between self–maintaining systems and self–referential 
systems. He argued that functionally autonomous entities (such as organizations) are 
abstract, they are self–referential but as they do not ‗self–produce‘ in a physical 
domain: they should therefore be considered as self–maintaining but not autopoietic. 
Thus both Varela and Hejl identify social systems as belonging to the broader class of 
autonomous, operationally closed and self–organising/self–referential systems but not 
as autopoietic. Further, the concept of autopoiesis only offers new insight into systems 
that do self–produce in a physical domain: biological systems as per the genesis of the 
concept. In relation to other classes of system the concept of operational closure and 
self–organization are sufficient and equivalent 
To revisit some fundamentals, the criteria Maturana and Varela (1980) used to 
distinguish autopoietic systems are: 
1. their principle output is themselves, i.e. they are first and foremost self–producing; 
2. they bring forth their own boundary as a result of their ongoing process of self 
production; 
3. they are operationally closed and are therefore autonomous—their response to 
perturbation being entirely determined by their structure; 
4. in the case of composite unities there is mutual dependence between the levels of 
autopoiesis—the continued autopoiesis of the components of a composite unity is 
dependent on the maintenance of the autopoiesis of the composite unity and vice 
versa. 
Criterion 2 refers to the necessary existence of a ‗boundary‘. This is inextricably 
linked to self–production as it is the boundary, amongst other things, which is to be 
self–produced. The key issue concerns the required tangibility or materiality of such a 
boundary. The existence of a physical boundary was an important attribute of 
autopoietic systems identified in the earlier work of Maturana and Varela although 
there was ambiguity about whether the physicality was a necessary condition for a 
system to be classed as autopoietic. Gaines (1981) identifies, for example, that in 
Maturana and Varela‘s 1975 work, Autopoiesis and Cognition: the organization of the 
living, from which the above criteria were drawn, the authors permit that an 
autopoietic unity may be distinguished from its environment by a “concrete or 
conceptual operation of distinction.”. This implies that an autopoietic unity may arise 
both as an ontological fact and/or as a result of an epistemological act of an observer. 
If the requirement for tangibility is to be so relaxed, it is still necessary to identify the 
boundedness of autopoietic systems and to identify how this boundedness is self–
maintained.  
Mingers (1995) notes that the boundary of a social system is not physical in the way 
that a cell boundary is physical. There has been some attempt to equate boundary with 
belonging to some class or set. Zeleny and Hufford, for example, adopt this approach. 
They argue that social or categorical boundaries are readily distinguished and that 
restricting the definition to tangible boundaries “serves no useful purpose” (1991: 
322). Mingers, in addressing this point states: 
A physical  boundary has a spatial  dimension forming a barrier 
between inside and outside. This is not  the case for  a membership –
type boundary; some members are not nearer the outsid e than others 
(Mingers 1995: 128) .  
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Thus in Mingers‘ view, this substitution is unsatisfactory. Replacement of a physical 
boundary with a categorical distinction is substitution of a different equivalence class. 
A categorical distinction has no necessary operational basis or topological 
characteristics. Members are identified as related through a shared characteristic, there 
is no implied relation either spatially or through identification of functional 
interdependence.  
Mingers reference to topology is interesting and important. It points to unexpected 
areas of ambiguity in the concept of boundedness, even for physical systems. Hejl 
(1984) notes, for example, that problems of boundary identification are not confined 
to social systems but are already present with biology. His point can be appreciated by 
considering the following questions: are the inside membranes of the lungs, 
oesophagus and intestines ‗inside‘ or ‗outside‘ of the human body?; is the boundary of 
a pond ecology the waters edge?. When considering the boundaries of social systems 
he concludes that; as a systems boundary is „constituted through the interactions of 
the components‟ (1984: 72) and; as individuals are nodes in many intersecting social 
systems, and further, as the observer needs to be included in this ‗network‘ of 
intersecting social systems, then: 
i t  is  not enough to define [the boundary] as an external observer .  If  
we want to know where the boundaries of  what we take hypothetically 
as a social  system are, we have to observe as well  as ask the 
individuals who consti tute i t  (Hej l  1984: 72) .  
This is highly suggestive of naturalistic enquiry. The cases we have presented here 
involved a degree of this in that the methods stayed close to the language usage of the 
contributors and they were involved in the choice of anecdotes. In the second case the 
natural language was again used in order to find evidence of points of relative closure.  
In social systems then, boundaries are defined by observers and it matters where we 
draw them. This is not to say that we cannot gain some empirical clues as to where we 
may usefully draw them and the Wikipedia case provides an example of the type of 
data that may be used for this purpose and the implications of drawing it in different 
places. 
Overall Conclusions 
The first case suggests that it may be possible to map the key distinctions which 
characterise and contribute to the coherence of particular linguistic domains. The 
challenge is in gaining sufficient initial lead to know where to look closely. We have 
identified several conventional tools which can be used.  Elsewhere we have also 
outlined a model to assist with the interpretation of the resulting findings (Goldspink 
et al. 2008). These are relatively easy to use and have modest data needs – a great deal 
can be gleaned from a well targeted and small scale collection of information from a 
few key players as was illustrated in the case. Doing so could prove highly valuable in 
a wide range of high value organizational change exercises. These include Mergers 
and acquisitions, structural change programs and cultural realignment exercises. It 
demonstrates that the abstract theory being derived from autopoiesis can be used to 
significant pragmatic effect and in real time in organizational transformation exercises. 
The analysis provides insights into the drivers of particular patterns and provides 
some clues to a) the feasibility of attempting to change them and the likely scale of 
intervention needed b) where best to target any intervention so as to increase the 
likelihood of an outcome which has some similarity to that which was intended.  
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The second case is interesting for an altogether different reason. It too provides 
practical understanding, in this case of the governance processes associated with a 
new form of organization and how they are influenced by technical and social 
artefacts. It also demonstrates how conventional methods may be employed, although 
in this case the analysis was time consuming and not feasible for dynamic 
interpretation of events. The main contribution of this case therefore remains 
theoretical. It helps answer a long standing controversial question among users of 
autopoietic theory: are social systems (including organizations) autopoietic?  
Despite protestations to the contrary autopoiesis and complexity theory can provide 
practical tools and guidance to real world organizational and social problems. In 
combination they offer an opportunity to move past many of the long standing 
problems of alternative social and organizational theory which are largely based on 
the assumption of change as the exception rather than the norm (Burrell and Morgan 
1980). They provide a means for directly theorising about and, perhaps more 
importantly, researching and responding managerially to the interplay or dialectic 
between micro and macro level phenomena which are constitutive of organizational 
phenomena. While the theory we have been developing is not yet complete or fully 
articulated and while techniques which could see it applied most directly (such as 
multi-agent modelling) are still under-developed we have demonstrated here that it 
can still be put to use.  
We have also argued that the greatest potential lies in working with the original 
conception developed by Maturana and Varela not on the grounds that it was 
complete and inviolate, but on the grounds that it offers a critical foundation 
otherwise lacking in social theory: an answer to the question ‗in what way is human 
social behaviour derived from and constrained by our biology?‘. Excellent work is 
underway to advance and consolidate this foundation without needing to violate the 
essential premises upon which the original theory was based. We refer here to the 
work being undertaken in neuro-phenomenology (Thompson and Varela 2001; 
Rudrauf et al. 2003; Thompson 2004), Artificial Life (Moreno and Etxeberria 1995; 
Moreno et al. 1997; Barandiaran 2005; Barandiaran and Moreno 2006; Duijn et al. 
2006) and Robotics (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Di Paolo and Lizuka 2007; Di 
Paolo et al. 2007). To attempt to redefine autopoiesis to make it fit with the 
constitutively different nature of social systems is not necessary and moves to de-
couple it from its grounding in biology serve to weaken its application. In Luhmann 
for example, the issue of domain intersection is highly problematic. It represents a 
retreat from coming to terms with the fundamental origins of social behaviour in the 
cognitive capability of living breathing human agents.  
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